Media Queries. Contact H. Most Recent From Anthony H. Cordesman On Demand Event. Book Launch: Armies of Arabia. November 12, In the News. UAE pursues better border security collaboration, more domestic capabilities.
Defense News Agnes Helou. November 8, The New Challenges in Aid to Afghanistan. The chances of any cease-fire lasting, only in the s, have increased to 88 percent. Given congressional opposition to U. But that is more a symptom of our broken politics than of sensible policy.
What if the United States preempted a U. General Assembly resolution with a Security Council resolution endorsing a two-state solution? It would have legal and normative implications, providing restraint to both sides and pushing them toward the negotiating table.
In the Arab world, where a public awakening is increasingly expressing anger with Israel , a new focus on U. His administration would not be pushing the envelope far with its own Security Council resolution or by abstaining on a resolution drafted by European allies.
What would such a resolution include? The actual borders of the two states, the fate of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, how the city of Jerusalem would be shared, and how the refugee issue would be resolved were debated in many different fora. While the two sides came close several times to agreeing on the substance of these parameters, no deal was ever reached. The goal of a two-state solution is under serious challenge today.
The number of settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has exceeded ,, putting in major doubt the prospect of a geographically contiguous Palestinian state. In Israel, the passage of a new nation-state law threatens the treatment of Arab and other citizens of Israel as second class, a move that many believe effectively legislates discrimination.
At the same time, divisions between the West Bank and Gaza along with Palestinian factional political disputes have done little to advance the Palestinian national project. As a result, Palestinian leaders are obliged to find solutions to such disputes in order to make progress in their cause. Moreover, there are clear signs of a growing perception among Palestinians and Israelis that a two-state solution that meets the minimum needs of both communities might be impossible to attain. Yet, the Israeli-Palestinian issue is not going away.
Rather, demographic trends and settlement construction mean that the two communities are growing ever closer physically while remaining separated politically, socially, and economically. This report attempts to look at actualities and trends with a fresh and analytical eye. At first glance, the two halves of this report contain two very different views of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: one presents the case for a two-state solution, the other suggests that it is time to look at the idea of a single state with all its variations.
But the two halves do not differ on the facts of the current situation. Nor do they differ much on the trajectory. The same facts can be used to support two different conclusions: Do we need new ideas or new determination and political will behind previous ones? The two chapters also highlight an important political reality: any solution must adequately address the needs of both sides. Imposed solutions will not work. The section authored by the Baker Institute does not deny that a one-state reality is emerging and the two-state solution is in trouble, but it argues that the two-state solution should not be abandoned as it provides the most coherent framework for a democratic Israeli state living in peace and security next to an independent and sovereign Palestinian state.
At a time when ideas to solve the conflict are being speculated about without much context, this report attempts to objectively analyze and present the two major options for a negotiated peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians and to explain the consequences of both for the parties involved and the international community. It is our hope that it will serve as not only a reminder of past efforts but also an incubator for future ones.
For much of the twenty-first century, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has stagnated and diplomatic initiatives have fallen short. Now, seventy years after the conflict began, progress toward a two-state solution has, by most standards, become even more challenging. Realities on the ground are complex, political trends on all sides have weakened peace camps, talks have stalled, and historic paradigms on negotiations and final-status issues are in question.
By most accounts, the next few years will be a critical juncture in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Facts on the ground, demographics, domestic politics, and geopolitical trends all suggest that the continued passage of time is eroding some of the bedrock principles that have defined the contours of the two-state solution for decades. Failure to address the conflict and its core issues, such as land for peace, is not in the U. In addition to outlining the importance of the two-state solution as the focal point of any future negotiations and offering a brief outline of what a solution might entail, this chapter advocates for the United States to be an important trusted broker for both sides in final status negotiations.
Separate analyses in this chapter on Israeli and Palestinian perceptions of a two-state solution by Gilead Sher, Khalil Shikaki, and Samih al-Abid shed light on the dynamic roles of Israeli and Palestinian public opinion and domestic politics in reaching an agreement. As diplomatic initiatives have failed, and facts on the ground have become more complex, it is understandable to question whether the window on a two-state solution is closing or has, indeed, closed.
However, the alternatives to a two-state solution pose serious problems in themselves, be it the continuation of the status quo, a single binational state, a confederation between Israel and Palestine, a confederation or association between Palestine and other Arab states particularly Jordan and Egypt , or other proposals. Debates over these alternative approaches have yet to adequately define sufficient common ground between the parties as to constitute a serious negotiating framework.
In short, these debates over alternatives to the two-state solution are so embryonic as to be currently uninstructive to diplomatic efforts. Continuing to seek two sovereign states for two sovereign peoples remains the most viable course and is in the long-term interest of all parties.
The mechanisms for negotiating and sustaining a solution might change and indeed may require new ideas and approaches , as will the breadth of issues to be addressed and agreed upon, but the ultimate solution remains the same. The case for a two-state solution for two peoples has not radically changed in the many years it has been made, but today the urgency is higher. In Israel, where security is the primary concern, the status quo has its advocates but its continuation has significant trade-offs.
Effective control of the West Bank and Gaza remains highly costly in terms of resources, limits strategic and economic opportunities with regional and international actors, erupts in intermittent conflicts, and raises significant issues. Any number of plausible scenarios in the years ahead may lead to deterioration in the situation and options. A policy of ambiguity brings with it increasing risk, and the establishment of two states makes it possible to pursue a comprehensive and effective regional peace structure, including special security arrangements and measures to effectively address dangerous state and nonstate actors.
Recognizing these realities and pursuing peace will require political courage and effective policies in the face of a skeptical public. But the need is great. For Palestinians, the years of Israeli occupation have taken a toll and realizing an independent state means that difficult choices must be made. Today, the divide between the West Bank and Gaza, the fractured nature of Palestinian politics, the ineffectiveness in some areas of governance, and the unconstructive rhetoric and intransigence do little to help the Palestinian national project.
There is a need for reconciliation among the Palestinian factions along the Quartet Principles, for reform efforts in Palestinian institutions, and a renewal of belief that the Palestinian national project is not dead.
The deteriorating situation in Gaza requires immediate action, and the international community is mobilized. Palestinian leaders have an obligation to their people to find solutions, which can be a catalyst for broader progress. On both sides, leadership today and in the future would be served by clarifying visions for peace, being pragmatic, and seeking common ground while being prepared to make the difficult decisions required for the long-term well-being of their people.
The critical distinction between equitable political compromise and capitulation should be the guideline. The parameters of a two-state solution are long-established and need not be reinvented. Importantly, despite the undeniable despondency that surrounds the conflict at present, these parameters continue to have a supportive constituency on both sides, as detailed later in this chapter.
The core of a two-state solution would address the following tenets:. These general parameters should constitute the core of the peace plan. There are certainly other issues to be considered, negotiated, and addressed—including timelines, specific security arrangements, economic regimes, and investment—but failure to address the core issues will not lead to a sustainable and lasting peace. Central to a final agreement will be reaching a mutually acceptable permanent territorial division between Israel and Palestine on the basis of the June 4, , lines with agreed land swaps, bringing about the end of occupation.
A map defining the territories of Israel and Palestine is a key factor for moving the peace process forward. A potential understanding on the territorial issue would enable Israel to integrate agreed areas of settlements into the recognized sovereign territory of Israel and evacuate or relocate the settler population from the agreed Palestinian territory.
On the Palestinian side, the definition of a permanent border is critical to state-building; it creates the certainty necessary to successfully manage refugee resettlement and economic state-building measures and allows the Palestinian government to plan and construct an effective physical infrastructure to build a prosperous Palestinian state. At the start of negotiations, and as the parties move forward, a settlement freeze would be a critical act of good faith as, time and again, settlements have been one of the greatest barriers to negotiations.
Negotiations on territory while Israel continues to expand settlements have only complicated negotiations in the past and will do so in the future. Israeli control of large swaths of the West Bank makes negotiations increasingly complex, and Palestinian governance and day-to-day life difficult.
Today, the West Bank is fragmented, with a majority of the land under the control of Israel. More than , Israeli settlers live in settlements constituting 2. Moreover, the settlements are connected to each other and Israel through a well-developed road network that covers 2.
As negotiations move forward, a settlement freeze will be an important act of good faith from the Israeli government. For Palestinians, a settlement freeze builds trust and confidence, which have been lacking after more than twenty years of talks. It also preserves the possibility of a two-state solution and allows for meaningful improvements on the ground and infrastructure development that will be immediately felt by Palestinians.
This will shore up Palestinian support for both the two-state solution and for the current Palestinian leadership. For Israelis, a settlement freeze would allow negotiations to move forward, and alleviate concerns by the international community that Israel intends to annex the West Bank and indefinitely deny Palestinians political rights. A settlement freeze facilitates a realistic adjustment in the expectations of the settler community and establishes certain geopolitical realities between Palestinians and Israelis that support a two-state solution.
On both sides of the conflict, Israeli and Palestinian publics have become increasingly disillusioned with the two-state solution. In Israel, security concerns have pushed the body politic considerably to the right.
Polling shows that for the majority of Israelis, reaching a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a low priority—the status quo is satisfactory.
In the Palestinian territories, many feel that Oslo and the Palestinian national project have failed, and debates over alternatives have begun. However, while political trends on both sides seem discouraging, public opinion is dynamic, changing according to the political atmosphere. The public has shown that trust can be rebuilt, that leadership matters, and that the belief that peace is possible is critical.
In the following sections, Gilead Sher and Khalil Shikaki address the complex public opinion environment in Israel and Palestine as well as its challenges and opportunities. Today, the odds of attaining a final agreement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are long, for several reasons: the gaps in the historical narratives of Israelis and Palestinians are wide, and are growing wider over time; there is mutual distrust between the respective leaderships and societies; the parties are far apart on the permanent status of core, contentious issues; the leaders are reluctant to move ahead and seem unprepared to take the risks involved in advancing peace; and, at present, there is no reliable, mutually trusted broker to facilitate a negotiation process.
Additionally, developments in the broader Middle East and across the Arab world in the last decade have further complicated the intertwined nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have pushed it down the priority list of the Arab regimes, and have displayed trends that are concerning to decisionmakers in the region and beyond.
In addition, within the Israeli and the Palestinian political systems there are domestic inhibitors to the process. Polling reveals valuable information about Israeli public opinion on the core issues of the conflict—shown to be Jerusalem, settlements, and security—and what may incentivize and make politically feasible a two-state peace agreement.
Currently, public opinion trends in Israel are not highly favorable to a two-state solution, although no alternative vision is more favored. As the above polling indicates, public opinion on undefined solutions is divided.
To identify obstacles facing future negotiations, the National Security Index survey analyzed the key issues for Israeli society, which will almost certainly be central points of negotiation in future talks. To identify these issues and understand the drivers of support, respondents were first offered a two-state, permanent peace agreement. Subsequently, they were offered several incentivizing policies in combination with the initial agreement.
This polling offered insight into the current popularity of this outcome and potential opportunities to expand Israeli support for a two-state for two-peoples solution. Some of the key takeaways:. Such incentives are expanded upon in other polls, which examine issues that would drive support and alleviate concerns and objections to a two-state solution. Recent polls have indicated that the following policy incentives would dramatically increase support for a new proposal among both Israelis and Palestinians: 6.
In Palestine, the first decade of the twenty-first century showed significant public support for the concept of the two-state solution. Successive failed peace efforts have convinced many Palestinians that Israel is not ready for peace, that Israelis are unwilling to accept a historic compromise, and that Palestinians have no Israeli partner for a two-state solution.
Moreover, a perceived state-building failure at home has convinced many Palestinians, particularly youths, that a future Palestinian state will be corrupt and authoritarian. As a result, demand has increased for a one-state solution in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights—one person, one vote.
The roots of this trend are important and suggest that public opinion is flexible and related to perceptions of the feasibility of peace. Key reasons for pessimism regarding the two-state solution are the prevailing perception that the two-state solution is no longer practical or viable; the belief that the Israeli Jewish side does not support the two-state solution; and the belief that support for such a solution is not the normative view of Palestinian society.
Indeed, most Palestinians believe that Israelis do not want peace. Distrust in Israelis as a partner and in the feasibility of a two-state solution is high. Distrust erodes the willingness to take risks and make compromises. Given the huge distrust of Israel and Israelis among Palestinians, one cannot count on public opinion to be a vehicle for positive change.
However, while the public is not a force for peace, it is not an impediment to peace. If leaders do reach a peace agreement, polling suggests that the public is likely to support it. Still, even if the public can be brought back to supporting negotiations and the concept of the two-state solution, there is a key question that must be addressed before one can declare that solution viable. Since the beginning of the peace process, it has been well known that there are issues—one can call them sacred values or deal breakers—that are essentially not open to negotiation.
In other words, we need to determine whether, given the conflicting interests of the two sides, it would still be possible to find mutually agreeable solutions to all the major components of the most feasible two-state solution package. Based on public opinion research among Palestinians, particularly during the past three years, findings point to one conclusion: Palestinian public opinion is not an impediment to peace based on the implementation of a two-state solution that addresses these core issues.
It should be clear, however, that while public opinion has at times been a driving force influencing policy changes in the Palestinian Authority and among the different Palestinian factions, it is doubtful that it has the capacity to push a reluctant or weak leader to take the huge risks involved in any permanent agreement with Israel. However, to the extent that the stalemate in the peace process is driven by leaders who believe that their public and constituency do not support the required compromises, a deeper understanding of public attitudes can give them a greater incentive to take risks.
In May , tensions erupted when the U. Embassy relocated from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Ancient History Encyclopedia.
What is Palestine and Palestinians? Israel Science and Technology Directory. Everything you need to know about Israel-Palestine. Map: The countries that recognize Palestine as a state. Washington Post. UN Partition Plan.
BBC News. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation. The History Learning Site. Timeline: History of a Revolution. Al Jazeera. Hamas accepts Palestinian state with borders. Palestine Liberation Organization. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Oslo Accords Fast Facts. Profile: Hamas Palestinian movement. But if you see something that doesn't look right, click here to contact us!
Subscribe for fascinating stories connecting the past to the present. The nation of Israel—with a population of more than 9 million people, most of them Jewish—has many The Oslo Accords were a landmark moment in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East. Actually a set of two separate agreements signed by the government of Israel and the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization PLO —the militant organization established in to
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